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ENERGIZING THE INDIAN ECONOMY: 
OBSTACLES TO GROWTH IN THE INDIAN 
OIL AND GAS SECTOR AND STRATEGIES 
FOR REFORM 
Krishnan A. Devidoss*
Abstract: India is rapidly becoming one of the largest consumers of en-
ergy in the world. At the same time, India continues to be hindered by 
bureaucratic delays, an archaic tax system, security problems and pro-
hibitive investment regulations that have made expansion and consoli-
dation in the petroleum sector difªcult. This Note explores underlying 
structural problems in India’s investment, tax, and regulatory climate 
that have worked to the detriment of Indian oil and gas companies. This 
Note argues that corruption, problems associated with contractual sta-
bility, a restrictive investment climate, and security concerns have pre-
vented meaningful mergers and acquisitions by Indian companies, pre-
vented them from exploring oil and gas opportunities abroad, and have 
disadvantaged them with respect to their competitors in other coun-
tries. This Note further argues that despite India’s progress in liberaliz-
ing its economy, its government must work to address these core under-
lying problems in order to secure a stable and secure supply of energy 
to meet its growing demands. 
Introduction 
 As India comes of age in the world economy its oil and natural 
gas needs continue to grow.1 Like China, which is becoming increas-
ingly dependent on the importation of oil to meet surging demand, 
India, which currently imports seventy percent of its oil, will continue 
to seek access in foreign markets for its energy needs, particularly 
from its neighbors in the Near East, as well as from Russia.2 At the 
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1 Jay Solomon, Rice Airs Concern Over Gas Pipeline from Iran to India, Wall St. J., Mar. 17, 
2005, at A14. 
2 Reliance Bucks India Petrol Trend, BBC News, May 12, 2006, http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/2/hi/business/4764607.stm; see Sanjay Dutta, Bold Oil Diplomacy Pays Off, Times of 
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same time, Indian petroleum companies will need to develop oil and 
gas ªelds off the coast of India so as not to become too dependent on 
these foreign sources of oil.3 As Indian energy companies seek to 
grow, they will invariably beneªt from foreign capital and will also 
beneªt from internal consolidation of the energy sector, much like 
companies from other countries that are better capitalized and that 
are winning bidding wars.4 Indian companies, however, face formida-
ble obstacles to procuring foreign investment and capital due to ad-
ministrative hurdles and corruption at the national level as well as 
foreign pressure against business ventures with Iran.5
 This Note addresses the state of the Indian energy sector, includ-
ing obstacles to meeting future energy needs and proposals for re-
form. Part I considers India’s political climate and recent economic 
reforms and how they have affected the industry, as well as India’s 
current energy needs. Part II addresses obstacles to investment in the 
Indian oil and gas sector, including problems associated with corrup-
tion, contractual instability, and macroeconomic policies. Part III dis-
cusses what the Indian government can do to encourage foreign in-
vestment in the energy sector, addresses security concerns related to 
supply, and proposes strategies to bolster exploration opportunities 
domestically and internationally. 
I. Background 
 India is the second largest country in the world in terms of popula-
tion, has the fourth largest economy in the world, and boasts the sec-
ond largest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) among developing coun-
tries based on purchasing power parity.6 India’s economy continues to 
grow at an average of six to eight percent annually, driven by consumer 
and corporate spending.7 Despite rising oil prices and delays in eco-
                                                                                                                      
3 See John Larkin, India Gains Hope in Filling Its Own Surging Oil Needs, Wall St. J., Dec. 
22, 2004, at A11. 
4 See Danielle Mazzini, Stable International Contracts in Emerging Markets: An Endangered 
Species?, 15 B.U. Int’l L.J. 343, 359 (1997); A Rage for Oil, supra note 2; Ravi Mahajan & 
Sanjay Chakrabarti, The New Exploration and Licensing Policy, Bus. Line (India), May 30, 
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 8549976; Josey Puliyenthuruthel, India to Merge Energy Com-
panies, DAILY DEAL, Mar. 14, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 3836402. 
5 See Mark Baker, Awakening the Sleeping Giant: India and Foreign Direct Investment in the 
21st Century, 15 Ind. Intl. & Comp. L. Rev. 389, 391 (2005); Toral Patel, Corrupt Practices in 
India: No Payoff, 20 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 389, 399 (1998); Solomon, supra note 1, at 
A14. 
6 Baker, supra note 5, at 390. 
7 See Eric Bellman, Indian Economic Boom Continues, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 2005, at A5. 
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nomic reforms, India continues to remain an attractive site for foreign 
investment due to its large market and economic potential.8
 Unlike China, India has not achieved its potential because of its 
investment climate.9 Foreign direct investment (FDI) as a share of 
India’s GDP was less than one percent in 2002 and 2003, as compared 
to four percent in China during the same period.10
 For most of its post-independence history, India was ruled by the 
Congress Party.11 The Congress Party, founded by Indian freedom 
ªghters molded in the British Fabian socialist tradition, believed in a 
social welfare state, advocated self-sufªciency, and was generally suspi-
cious of foreign investment.12 The Indian economy remained closed 
to foreign investors for decades, until ªnance minister (now Prime 
Minister) Dr. Manmohan Singh, a Cambridge-trained economist, re-
moved governmental obstacles and opened India’s doors to foreign 
investment under the Industrial Policy of 1991.13
 In 1998 the Congress Party was defeated by the Hindu nationalist 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).14 Despite being a nationalist party, the BJP 
quickly proved itself to be a more economically liberal party, accelerat-
ing liberalization of the economy and beginning a process of privatiza-
tion.15 The Indian economy experienced some of its fastest growth dur-
ing BJP rule; however, there were concerns that the beneªcial effects of 
liberalization were not being felt by its poorest citizens.16
 The BJP was voted out of ofªce and the Congress Party, headed 
by Dr. Manmohan Singh and Finance Minister P. Chidambaram, re-
gained power in 2004.17 Though the Singh government declared itself 
committed to the ideas embodied in the Industrial Policy of 1991, 
such as the privatization and labor ºexibility initiated by Congress and 
                                                                                                                      
8 See Baker, supra note 5, at 390; Patel, supra note 5, at 389; Bellman, supra note 7, at A5. 
9 See Baker, supra note 5, at 411. 
10 Id. 
11 See Amy Waldman, India Swears in 13th Prime Minister and First Sikh in Job, N.Y. Times, 
May 23, 2004, at A6. 
12 Jeswald W. Salacuse, Renegotiating International Project Agreements, 24 Fordham Int’l 
L.J. 1319, 1343 (2001); see Rada Rajadhyaskha & Nina Martyria, Not with My Icon, You Don’t, 
Times of India, Aug. 29, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 11962138. 
13 Baker, supra note 5, at 392; John Lancaster, Sonia Gandhi Declines Prime Minister Position 
More Tumult in India Hindu Nationalists Protested Against Her, Lexington Herald Leader 
(Kentucky), May 19, 2004, at A3; see Waldman, supra note 11, at A6. 
14 BJP Called to Form New Government, CNN, Mar. 15, 1998, http://edition.cnn.com/ 
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1, 2 (2005). 
16 See id. 
17 See Waldman, supra note 11, at A6; Ninian, supra note 15. 
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accelerated by the BJP, it and its leftist coalition partners signaled that 
the pace of many of the reforms would slow down.18
 Among the sectors where privatization and foreign investment 
was temporarily decelerated was the energy sector.19 The Indian gov-
ernment committed itself instead to developing bilateral ties with its 
neighbors, including Iran and the Central Asian countries, in order to 
secure oil and natural gas.20 This partnership has frustrated efforts by 
the United States to isolate Teheran and has strained U.S.-India rela-
tions.21
II. Discussion 
 Indian law dictates that all natural resources embedded in the 
earth’s crust belong to the state and that all petroleum and natural 
gas found in situ is national property.22 Private operators require a 
license, which is subject to open bidding, from the central govern-
ment.23 The regulatory framework in oil and gas exploration is gov-
erned through the New Exploration and Licensing Policy (NELP) 
and more broadly through the Industrial Policy of 1991, both of 
which aim to increase foreign participation in drilling and investment 
in India’s oil and gas sector.24
 Though NELP and the Industrial Policy of 1991 have improved 
the investment climate for FDI, “delays, complexities, obfuscations, 
overlapping jurisdictions and endless request[s] for more information 
remain much the same as they have always been.”25 Underlying struc-
tural obstacles to the development of India’s oil sector can broadly be 
grouped into four categories.26 The ªrst set of problems includes 
                                                                                                                      
 
18 See Waldman, supra note 11, at A6; India Scraps Sales of State Firms, BBC News, Aug. 16, 
2005, http://news.bbc.c.uk/go/pr/fr/~/2/hi/business/4156612.stm. But see Mazzini, supra 
note 4, at 352 (noting that the economic policies of Congress and BJP nationally differed 
greatly from their state counterparts, as in Maharastra in that the BJP did not accelerate eco-
nomic reform at the state level). 
19 See India Scraps Sales of State Firms, supra note 18. 
20 See John Larkin & Jay Solomon, India’s Ties with Iran Pose Challenge for U.S., Wall St. 
J., Mar. 25, 2005, at A7. 
21 Id. 
22 What Is NELP?, Econ. Times (India), Jan. 31, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 1285513. 
23 Id. 
24 See Baker, supra note 5, at 392, 414 (describing Industrial Policy of 1991); What Is 
NELP?, supra note 22. 
25 Baker, supra note 5, at 414. 
26 See Baker, supra note 5, at 414 (describing problems associated with access to credit); 
Mazzini, supra note 4, at 352 (discussing contractual problems); Patel, supra note 5, at 389 
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those related to corruption in the Indian bureaucracy.27 The next 
general category of problems can be broadly deªned as contractual 
problems, based on investor fear of abrogation.28 Macroeconomic 
and ªnance problems, including difªcult access to credit, obstacles to 
privatizations and mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and onerous tax 
laws constitute the third general category of problems.29 Finally, for-
eign policy and security issues related to opposition to a proposed 
pipeline with Iran also continue to frustrate the Indian government’s 
efforts to secure petroleum from abroad.30
A. Corruption 
 Studies show that countries with high levels of corruption receive 
less foreign investment from all major source countries.31 Corruption 
has long been a problem for India in its quest to modernize and lib-
eralize its economy.32 Indian law condemns bribery through the In-
dian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947.33 The 
laws punish public servants who accept gratuities to inºuence the ex-
ercise of their public functions with a ªne and sentence of up to three 
years in prison.34 These laws, however, are frequently ignored.35 In 
addition, the laws only address corruption among public servants, 
and do not deal with persons who accept bribes in the course of pri-
vate business.36 Companies are forced to deal with a large number of 
government ofªcials from whom they must gain approval for licenses 
to conduct business.37 This ties up resources that could be used more 
                                                                                                                      
(discussing problems associated with corruption); Solomon, supra note 1, at A14 (discuss-
ing security concerns related to a proposed pipeline with Iran). 
27 See Patel, supra note 5, at 389. 
28 See Wendy N. Duong, Partnerships with Monarchs: Two Case Studies—Case Two Partner-
ships with Monarchs in the Development of Energy Resources: Dissecting an Independent Power Pro-
ject and Re-Evaluating the Role of Multilateral and Project Financing in the International Energy 
Sector, 26 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 69, 109 (2005); Mazzini, supra note 4, at 359–60. 
29 See Baker, supra note 5, 399–401; India Scraps Sales of State Firms, supra note 18; Puli-
yenthuruthel, supra note 4. 
30 See Farhana Khan & Anees Jillani, The Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline-Economy Com-
petes with Politics, Int’l Energy L. & Tax’n Rev. 152, 156–57 (2001); Solomon, supra note 
1, at A14. 
31 Baker, supra note 5, at 417. 
32 See Patel, supra note 5, at 398–99. 
33 Id. at 399. 
34 Id. at 400. 
35 Id. at 399. 
36 Id. at 401. 
37 Baker, supra note 5, at 416–17; see Patel, supra note 5, at 407. 
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productively and results in an additional burden on their enterprises 
as companies incur unnecessary interest costs.38
 Signiªcantly, bureaucratic delays in the form of red tape con-
tinue to exist, even though they have loosened considerably from be-
fore.39 These bureaucratic delays have resulted in the forfeiture of 
signiªcant business opportunities.40
B. Contract Instability 
 An additional concern for foreign companies seeking to invest in 
India or to lend capital to Indian companies for project ªnance is the 
instability of contracts due to corruption, fear of a change of govern-
ment, and ultimately, contract abrogation.41 One of the ªrst compa-
nies to receive fast-track approval from India’s new policy towards for-
eign investment was Enron, which formed a joint venture with 
Reliance Industries, Inc., India’s state-owned oil and gas company.42 
The aim of the project was exploration, development, production, 
and operation of oil and gas ªelds off the coast of Mumbai (formerly 
known as Bombay).43 The BJP coalition government of Maharastra, 
the Indian state where Mumbai is located, unilaterally cancelled the 
contract previously negotiated by the Congress-led state government, 
claiming that the project (known as Dabhol) would result in electric-
ity rates unaffordable for the general population, and that the coun-
try could undertake the project on its own.44 Such nationalistic con-
cerns, often cloaked in the mantle of democracy, have made many 
companies averse to entering the Indian market.45 Indeed, non-
payment for power supply to Dabhol from its sole customer, the utility 
authority of Maharastra, resulted in the collapse of Dabhol.46
 The Indian courts have been habitually overburdened by large 
caseloads.47 Businesses in India, hesitant to resort to foreign courts in 
the ªrst place, ªnd litigation expensive, uncertain, subject to proce-
                                                                                                                      
38 See Baker, supra note 5, at 417. 
39 Edward Luce, Growth Sparks a Race for Supplies, Ft.com, Jan. 17, 2005, available at 
2005 WLNR 627618; see Tracy Work, Note, India Satisªes Its Jones for Arbitration: New Arbitra-
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40 See Baker, supra note 5, at 416; Luce, supra note 39. 
41 See Mazzini, supra note 4, at 352, 359; Patel, supra note 5, at 397. 
42 Mazzini, supra note 4, at 351. 
43 Id. 
44 See Salacuse, supra note 12, at 1351–52. 
45 Id.; see Mazzini, supra note 4, at 359. 
46 See Duong, supra note 28, at 106. 
47 See Work, supra note 39, at 224. 
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dural delay, and a source of negative publicity.48 The overburdened 
court system has also contributed to delays that have affected the 
business environment, since businesses desire easy access to the court 
system.49 These concerns resulted in the passage of a revised arbitra-
tion act in 1996.50 With the passage of the revised arbitration law, the 
Indian government has shown its commitment to arbitration, but it is 
still unclear whether Indian courts will enforce awards from alterna-
tive dispute resolution (ADR) proceedings.51
C. Credit Restrictions, Fiscal Policies, and the Tax Environment 
 India’s investment climate is also a source of concern both to 
companies seeking to do business in India and for Indian companies 
looking to do business abroad.52 Indian ªscal policies have worked to 
the detriment of Indian companies looking for ªnancing for strategic 
M&As, and have provided unnecessary obstacles to the development 
of oil and gas ªelds located off India’s coast and within its borders.53
 India’s need for capital still exceeds its supply, working to the det-
riment of its companies that require foreign investment to ªnance their 
expansion and growth.54 Credit has been expensive and difªcult to ac-
cess, which has restricted the development of Indian companies.55 
While regulations often serve legitimate purposes in other countries, in 
India restrictions on credit and bureaucratic regulations provide op-
portunities for harassment.56 The interest cost to Indian companies is 
1.5% higher than in other countries in Asia, making expansion 
difªcult.57 Credit problems have made it difªcult for Indian companies 
to compete with China, whose companies have beneªted from greater 
consolidation and larger cash reserves that have allowed them to com-
pete in acquisitions that Indian companies are not ªnancially able to 
pursue.58
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49 See id. 
50 Id. at 228. 
51 Id. at 242. 
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53 See Baker supra note 5, at 424; Mazzini, supra note 4, at 350, 358; A Rage for Oil, supra 
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 The Indian government has not pursued mergers or privatization 
as vigorously as its rhetoric claims.59 Resistance to privatization comes 
from oil sector workers fearing loss of jobs, as well as pressure from 
Congress’s leftist coalition partners.60 The Indian Supreme Court 
ruled that the government could not further plans to privatize the oil 
companies Bharat Petroleum and Hindustan Petroleum, holding that 
only parliament could sign off on privatization.61 This makes privati-
zation extremely difªcult given the fractious nature of Indian politics 
and lack of consensus regarding economic policy.62 The Congress-led 
government put off plans to privatize Bharat Petroleum and Hindu-
stan Petroleum, and has so far not completed plans for the merger of 
the largest oil companies, Indian Oil and Oil and Natural Gas Corp. 
(ONGC), to create a national behemoth, though it maintains plans to 
do so in the future.63
 Tax laws also contribute to the negative investment climate in 
India, including the oil and gas sector.64 Though India’s tax laws have 
been relaxed to increase foreign investment, companies engaged in 
business in India are still subject to a variety of tax regulations, includ-
ing a service tax and a minimum alternate tax.65 Companies seeking 
to engage in oil and gas exploration in India also do not beneªt from 
an extended tax holiday, which often discourages them from explor-
ing in India.66 These taxes on exploration constitute a signiªcant bur-
den on oil and gas companies, especially when no gas is found.67
D. The Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline 
 Foreign policy and security concerns continue to hinder the im-
portation of liqueªed natural gas from India’s near-abroad, particu-
larly from Iran.68 The Indian and Iranian governments have explored 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Puliyenthuruthel, supra note 4, at 1; India Scraps Sale of State Firms, supra note 18. 
60 Soutik Biswas, India’s Privatisation Setbacks, BBC News, Sept. 16, 2003, http://news. 
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61 Biswas, supra note 60; Prabhat, supra note 60. 
62 See Biswas, supra note 60; Prabhat, supra note 60. 
63 India Scraps Sale of State Firms, supra note 18; Puliyenthuruthel, supra note 4. 
64 See Baker, supra note 5, at 399–400; Mahajan & Chakrabarthi, supra note 4. 
65 Baker, supra note 5, at 400; Mahajan & Chakrabarti, supra note 4. 
66 See Meghdoot Sharon, Probe Why Petro Majors Are Not Coming to India, Bus. Standard, 
July 8, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 4772651. 
67 Mahajan & Chakrabarti, supra note 4; Sharon, supra note 66. 
68 See Solomon, supra note 1, at A14. 
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the building of a 1.6 billion cubic feet (bcf) gas line that would travel 
from southern Iran through Pakistan to India.69 This pipeline would 
cost $3.5 billion and would potentially provide 3.2 bcf of gas per day.70 
While the United States has sought to ªnancially isolate Teheran due 
to concerns over its alleged acquisition of nuclear technology, India 
has continued to court Iran.71 The United States has indicated, how-
ever, that it is willing to separate the Iranian nuclear technology issue 
from that of the pipeline, and dropped its previously staunch opposi-
tion to the project.72 Domestic security concerns have also played a 
role in opposition to the pipeline, as the pipeline could be a potential 
target for terrorist groups and militants from Pakistan.73 India must 
deal with pleasing Washington and ensuring the security of the pro-
posed pipeline if it seeks to gain access to foreign energy to keep pace 
with its domestic demand.74
III. Analysis 
 India must address the structural problems in its economy and 
modify aspects of its regulatory environment in order to meet its en-
ergy needs.75 India must look within its borders to secure part of its 
oil and natural gas needs.76 As India seeks to increase its supply of oil 
and natural gas, however, it will necessarily have to look abroad.77 This 
certainly entails looking to Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the 
Middle East for its supply.78
A. Addressing Corruption 
 New Delhi should strengthen anti-corruption laws and apply 
them in equal force to private business and government ofªcials.79 
The government can also reduce the number of intermediaries in-
                                                                                                                      
69 Khan & Jillani, supra note 30, at 154. 
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volved in license-granting procedures and eliminate requirements for 
the consent or authorization of more than one person for non-clerical 
decisions.80 New Delhi should also ensure that the process of privati-
zation is more transparent, including the use of competitive bidding 
and public hearings.81
B. Ensuring Contract Stability 
 To protect themselves against unilateral sovereign or private can-
cellation, companies that invest in India also need to negotiate stabili-
zation or compensation clauses in all contracts.82 Renegotiation clauses 
might be a mechanism that would permit parties to avoid default, and 
may guard against the possibility of business being perceived in funda-
mentally different ways across the cultural divide.83 While India has al-
ready strengthened its arbitration laws, it should continue to actively 
encourage the use of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism to 
decrease the burden on India’s court system and provide for increased 
contractual stability.84 In addition, to the extent permitted by the new 
arbitration law, the courts should enforce awards resulting from alter-
native dispute resolution (ADR) proceedings as decrees of the court.85
C. Facilitating Access to Credit and Easing Tax Restrictions 
 Reducing obstacles to FDI ºows will be a major concern as India 
seeks to accommodate companies who require ªnancing for M&A 
and technology development.86 India should ease access to credit by 
decreasing the interest cost.87 By reducing the percentage of costs go-
ing to service debt, this will make India a more attractive site for for-
eign investment as well as facilitate expansion by Indian companies 
seeking to make foreign acquisitions.88
 India should also simplify its tax laws.89 Reducing taxes on explo-
ration and extending the tax holiday will have the effect of freeing up 
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87 See id. at 424–25. 
88 See id. at 417, 424. 
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resources for growth and expansion.90 This is especially true as Indian 
companies compete with China for access to oil and gas.91
 The central government should proceed with consolidation efforts 
to merge Indian Oil with ONGC, India’s largest state owned company, to 
create a competitive player in the world energy market.92 It should also 
privatize its petroleum companies, such as Bharat Petroleum and Hindu-
stan Petroleum, to foreign investors.93 By privatizing, the country could 
raise hundreds of billions of dollars to fund acquisitions and growth.94
 Under NELP, India has already taken steps to strengthen foreign 
investment in its petroleum sector and to lure more drillers with bet-
ter technology.95 The government should continue to encourage such 
investment.96 India has started to recognize the need for exploration 
within its borders, which is why, beginning in the late 1990s, the state 
began allocating blocks of territory to Indian and foreign drillers.97 
Due to the limited supply of oil within India’s borders, the govern-
ment needs to pay particular attention to attracting a wider variety of 
foreign drillers for oil and gas exploration.98
 Interestingly, the source of reluctance may be large foreign oil 
companies themselves, which often ªnd that the discoveries in India 
are not worth pursuing.99 Given India’s limited supply of domestic oil, 
it must continue to look to smaller companies from other countries 
for exploration.100 In addition to oil ªelds located off the coast of 
Mumbai, Cairn Energy, PLC, a Scottish energy concern, has located 
an oil deposit in the desert of Rajasthan that holds about one billion 
barrels of oil.101 Experts say that India’s geology of subterranean lay-
ers with fault lines should certainly contain oil and gas.102 If this is the 
case, small foreign companies like Cairn would certainly help to yield 
                                                                                                                      
90 See id.; Sharon, supra note 66. 
91 See Puliyenthuruthel, supra note 4. 
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93 See id. 
94 Id. 
95 New Indian Policy Holds More Promise for Canada’s Oil and Gas explorers, Asia Paciªc 
Bull., Jan. 21, 2005, available at http://www.asiapaciªcbusiness.ca/apbn/pdfs/bulletin192. 
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96 See id. 
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99 See Larkin, supra note 3, at A11. 
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discoveries within India’s borders and offshore.103 If the latest pro-
posals under NELP are implemented, smaller oil exploration con-
cerns can expect to see a reduction in the time taken to award an ex-
ploration contract, a greater availability of geo-scientiªc data online, 
and a single window for clearances.104
D. Resolve Foreign Policy Hindrances 
 Finally, India must address the lingering doubts of the United 
States concerning India’s ties with Teheran and national skepticism re-
garding its relations with Pakistan because the proposed pipeline is vital 
to India’s energy needs and would serve the ancillary function of build-
ing up Indo-Pakistani ties.105 The government should pursue U.S. Sec-
retary of State Condoleezza Rice’s suggestion that Washington and New 
Delhi engage in a broad energy dialogue.106 It might also accept a 
greater role in participating in talks with Iran, the European Union, 
and the United States over Iran’s nuclear program as a result of its en-
ergy partnership with Teheran.107
Conclusion 
 While the Indian economy has signiªcantly liberalized over the 
past decade, obstacles to investment in the form of corruption, con-
tract instability, and poor macroeconomic policies continue to hamper 
foreign direct investment and business expansion.108 For India to meet 
its surging oil and gas needs, it must address these problems by tackling 
corruption at all levels, promote the use of ADR, facilitate access to 
credit, and expose its oil and gas sector to market forces.109 India must 
also engage in broad energy and security dialogues with its neighbors 
and the United States.110 India should not return to its policy of self-
reliance, but must instead learn to open up to the world in a way that 
will ultimately beneªt the nation.111
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